elD Mark II

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Objectives to be assured:

- Privacy via technology and by default
- Data security
- Data minimization
- Decentralized storage
- Auditability and reusability
- Issued and revoked under state authority

Empty promises?

Personal data created when the base register or trust register are queried can be:

- recorded
- evaluated in pseudonymized, and
- **evaluated** without pseudonymization.

based on RVOG "for security" (RVOG Art 57, d/n/o), invoicing, etc.

► The government **may** operate systems that protect the privacy of the identity subjects.

Eh, what? "may"?

▶ The issuers **may** revoke any certifications they create.

No rules for that needed?

► The base and trust register operator (BIT) *does not* (!) learn the contents of the attestations, **except** from the data generated by the queries.

Does not is an odd formulation. Must not would be better. The queries may leak **everything**.

► The source is shared with public, except if it is **proprietary** or **insecure**. So it's not actually FLOSS, and likely most not actually shared source either.

- Data stored includes biometrics
- Data is not adequate for KYB
- Data is not compatible with eIDAS (no civil status, educational qualifications, licenses, titles, mandates, etc.)

So it's more sensitive data than eIDAS, but not compatible and less useful.

- Onboarding online against AI for free, or
- onboarding in-person for cash.

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- onboarding in-person for cash.

Insecure first, pay later. If you are unwilling to work with the AI, **pay extra** (nudge nudge nudge).

- Only a single eID is allowed
- ► Exact **secure** revocation process unclear

You must always carry the **same** smartphone (easier to track), and you must participate so you may learn about ID theft.

You need to do everything to prevent and report abuse.

You must thus install some **proprietary** software on a **proprietary** phone and then are **responsible** for all consequences and lack the necessary **understanding** for a proper legal defense.

- ► Your identity data is stored for **20 years**
- ▶ Your biometric data is stored for **5 years** after expiration

Banks "only" store for ${f 10}$ years. Data minimization indeed.

E-ID & EPD

- ▶ Mandate for health personal to use E-ID to access EPD
- ► Mandate for patients to use E-ID to access their EPD So much for **voluntary**.

E-ID & qualified electronic signatures

- ► E-ID sufficient for QES onboarding by private entities
- Offered by same commercial entities rejected previously

Best of luck to you, if someone manages to steal your E-ID via Al-onboarding.

The E-ID Law (BGEID) — Summary

- Not best possible security for onboarding
- ► Not actually FLOSS
- Not actually decentralized
- No actual data minimization
- No real privacy-by-design required
- ▶ No mandate for industry to support citizens without E-ID
- No mandate to support platforms other than Apple and Google

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"We don't preach 100% security. We do a facial image comparison." – Rolf Rauschenbach (BJ)

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"We are making ourselves dependent on the device manufacturers and operating system manufacturers. This is a compromise for user-friendliness." – Rolf Rauschenbach (BJ)

SSI Principles

An SSI ecosystem shall ...

- ... not require reliance on a centralized system to represent, control, or verify an entity's digital identity data.
- ... not restrict the ability of identity rights holders to move or transfer a copy of their digital identity data to the agents or systems of their choice.
- ... empower identity rights holders to secure their digital identity data at rest and in motion, to control their own identifiers and encryption keys, and to employ end-to-end encryption for all interactions.
- ... not require an identity rights holder to participate.
- ... provide the means for any entity—human, legal, natural, physical or digital—to be represented by any number of digital identities.

Recommendations

E-ID should be:

- voluntary, without financial disadvantages or exclusion for non-participation
- secure, without compromising for convenience or cost
- privacy-preserving, with FLOSS, mandatory cryptographic protections and no loopholes